(Article from Politicsweb)
From Mangaung to Nkandla - a Journey to
nowhere!
In the third week
of December 2012 Jacob Zuma was re-elected as president of the ANC at
the 53rd National Elective Conference at Mangaung (Bloemfontein)
in the central Free State.
Nkandla is the personal country
homestead of Zuma in rural Kwazulu-Natal. It has also been
called the "presidential compound" or "tribal
village". It is an extensive complex housing his extended
family, with state of the art electronic surveillance systems,
helicopter landing pad, elaborate roads, underground bunkers and
security personnel. What brought Nkandla into the limelight are
widespread allegations that much of the country homestead has been
funded by taxpayers' money.
Zuma's redeployment by the ANC at
Mangaung in December 2012 may guarantee his continued presence at
Nkandla as president of the country which could put him in power up
to 2019.
This journey from Mangaung to Nkandla
explains the interaction between the ANC as liberation
movement and the ANC as government in power and the
current impact on the country. In particular, it provides a much
needed understanding of the complex interaction between party and
state in the present political dispensation and exposes the reasons
why the current political dispensation has been failing for the past
decade or more.
It has to be understood that the
country's functional decline is not solely the result of Zuma's
deployment in 2007 and neither will his recent redeployment in
December 2012 fix the problem. What has gone wrong by 2013 can be
traced right back to the political settlement of 1994.
It is part of a self-destructive
process that had been embedded very deep in the political system by
the political power brokers at the time. The mere appointment of a
new president with a new (old) team will not solve the problem; what
has been emerging now is broad system failure. It is something
entirely different!
At the start of 2013 the country is in
deep trouble, however, this concept will have to be explained.
Suffice to state as introductory comment is the observation that
Zuma's journey from Mangaung to Nkandla is expected to be a journey
to nowhere. Over the past year or two, the possibility of a "failed
state" has surreptitiously emerged in the media.
The concept of a "failed state"
was mentioned, but not really discussed, as if the people involved
were politically too scared - or ignorant - in dealing with the
implications. The slow emergence of a failed state, and then very
often unobserved under the radar scan of parliament, implies a
certain fatal decline of a constitutional democracy and the role of
political parties. Even mentioning the possibility of a failed state
situation is not only serious, but has extremely dangerous
implications for any state.
A document like this is not for broad
public consumption as it may endanger the established and comfortable
mindset of the voting public and threaten the perceived and
propagated logical framework of party policy. Politicians prefer a
happy voting public, not a disturbed one. This document may challenge
the existing, fixed mindset - and that is politically not always
welcome! It is a document for the decision maker, who does not have
the luxury of deferring difficult situations. It has been written for
a reader who thinks and plans for up to 2020 and beyond, for the
current political dispensation is unlikely to continue past Zuma's
second term in office.
The critical question by 2013 is
therefore: if there are convincing facts and arguments that the
current political dispensation may decay to the point of systemic
collapse - a failed state - in the next five to seven years, what has
to be done? This is a question that can be posed to every business
executive, every activist group in civil society, and each parent
with kids in school or on their way to school. It is also true for
expats with family in South Africa and families with children abroad.
Will there ever be an opportunity for them to return?
The unthinkable of 1994 will have to be
contemplated by 2013. The country may slide into a process of
governing collapse. This does not necessarily imply a civil war, but
an inevitable decay of governing functions to the point of
spontaneous implosion - the key functions of state just cease to
exist! Society just becomes governmentally empty - a stateless
society. This was never considered in 1994; however, by 2013 it has
to be argued as an alarming reality.
If spontaneous implosion of governing
capabilities materialises, what becomes of government? Equally
important, what happens to society and population? When society
arrives at this point, is there still any meaning in a free and fair
election? If the past has not been a success, what about the
future?
Dr Jan du Plessis is editor and
publisher of Intersearch.
This is an edited extract from the
Intersearch Management Briefing for January 2013. Dr Du Plessis can
be contacted at mb@intersearch.co.za
